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Abstract: Economic literature on economic growth and FDI (foreign direct investment) 
implies that FDI can facilitate growth of recipient economy via capital inflow instantly and 
via positive spillovers and inclusion into international productive and innovative networks ex 
post. In this paper the role of FDI is examined by using bi-variate Granger causality test for 
growth, merchandise exports and imports, and by modeling growth equation with FDI as one 
of the explanatory variables in pool regression for 11 transition economies in CEE. Granger 
causality test is done additionally for each economy in the sample individually, which later 
enables better interpretation of pool regression results. The final results of the quantitative 
analysis imply that FDI cannot account for higher growth of the observed economies. FDI 
appears insignificant for growth. The finding can be explained by the fact that FDI have not 
contributed to the capital formation strongly because they have dominantly flown in as 
brownfield investments into services. Market-orientation of FDI coupled with the use of home 
country suppliers’ or parent company’s goods and services might have helped to annul the 
positive effects of FDI.  
 
 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, economic growth, Central and Eastern Europe, 
spillover, competitive effect, enterprise restructuring, industrial networks, absorptive capacity.  
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FDI and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Is there a link? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
FDI inflows in CEEC have been given vast political and economic attention since the 
beginning of the 1990es. It has been argued that, among many benefits, foreign investors 
would transfer the newest technology and thus improve productivity, product quality and 
accelerate exports in the recipient economies, which would eventually spur growth. These 
attitudes have been described and put in benign concept of FDI in economic literature (Moran, 
1998).  However, the scientific evidence and research on the links between FDI and economic 
growth have shed some doubt on the validity of those arguments, at least in the Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). So far, not enough evidence has been given to support either benign or 
malign (Moran, 1998) concept of FDI. We find only a few studies researching the link and the 
possible effect that FDI might have had in CEE using quantitative approach from a 
macroeconomic perspective (Fabry, 2001, Mencinger, 2003). Perhaps that can be explained 
with the difficulties that researchers encounter with the consistency of the macroeconomic 
data in the observed region, as well as a limited availability of the uniform data for the whole 
region. Although more evidence is present from the results of microeconomic studies, they are 
mostly confined to case studies of a single recipient country or to case studies of a single 
foreign investing country. Microeconomists encounter the same problems with data as 
macroeconomists and that is why we find that their studies using quantitative approach have 
been based on their own data (collected through survey of firms). Those evidence and the 
results have been most helpful for interpretation of our own results and for better understand 
of the nature of foreign investment enterprises (FIE) in CEE.  
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Our approach to researching the connection between FDI and growth in CEE is embodied in 
two major parts of the paper. In the first part of the paper, we give an overview of a 
theoretical base to studying the link between FDI and growth and then move on to providing 
an empirical overview of the evidence and interpretations of the link in CEE given by 
different authors. The primary intention of the first part of the paper is to better explain the 
possible “dual” (benign vs. malign) nature of FDI as opposed to inclining to one concept. 
Secondly, an overview of both macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence from CEE has 
been written with the intention to encompass the multifaceted nature of FDI, as the main 
theory of FDI - the eclectic theory of FDI - is built on both branches of micro- and 
macroeconomic theory. Finally, the results of microeconomic studies and the case studies 
would help us better understand the results of our quantitative research. 
 
The second part of the paper is concerned with quantitative examination of the link between 
FDI and growth. Bivariate Granger causality test is done for each of the countries in the 
samples of 11 CEE countries and used to find out whether changes in the FDI inflows precede 
changes in the level of quarterly GDP, merchandise exports and imports. When the test results 
show that changes in FDI precede the changes in other variables, we complement the result 
with cross correlation coefficient to establish the sign of the connection.  
By having an overview of these possible connections, we are able to better interpret the 
results of a growth model. We then move on to testing a growth equation that was used on a 
sample of 8 countries in CEE by Mencinger (2003). Pool regression is used to test the 
equation, which is insignificantly altered with the omission of one of the explanatory 
variables (country dummy variable) used by Mencinger.  
 4 
2. Starting points: links between economic growth and foreign direct investment in 
theories, models and empirical work 
 
As a component of capital, FDI1 can together with labour and technology compose the 
production function in the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956), but in the long run 
increase in FDI will result in decreasing returns. The neoclassical theory assumes there is no 
interdependence or relations between capital, labour and technology – all variables are 
exogenous. On the other hand, should FDI provoke technological progress (although there is 
no explanation how this may happen), they may indirectly affect long term economic growth.  
 
The next group of models, known as endogenous growth models considered technological 
progress an endogenous variable (Romer, 1986, 1990).  In those models technological 
progress stems from the activity of individuals or firms. Growth theorists also allowed for the 
possibility of increasing returns and the expansion of the definition of (financial) capital to 
human and physical capital. There are two ways – a direct and an indirect way - for capital to 
influence growth. Firstly, increase of capital per capita will result in the rising productivity, 
which will increase growth. And secondly, foreign investors may be creators of technological 
progress, on which impetus to growth is based. Externalities are additionally introduced in the 
model as a route to spilling over of technological progress (for example, from the foreign 
investment enterprise) unintentionally to other agents in the economy. Learning from others, 
training at work, knowledge and experience of others are freely available to all.  
 
                                                 
1 The purist definition by which FDI is only considered in financial terms is not surprising as neoclassical growth 
model has arisen in 1950es. A new, expanded definition of FDI was proposed by Hymer (1976). His definition 
of what he referred to as “international operations”, besides capital also includes the transfer of knowledge, skills 
and technology.  
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Models based on research and development models of endogenous growth (also known as 
Neoschumpeterian models) are considered more realistic than previous models because of 
their assumption that markets are imperfect (Grossman and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992). This assumption implies that technology is no longer available freely and 
therefore firms with market power have an incentive to innovate and protect their innovations 
via patenting. Innovators-leaders can capture extra profits while their followers, to which 
innovators can sell their technology, earn lower profits. However, the knowledge that has 
resulted from innovating can be spilled over and thus is still available freely.  
 
Indeed, in his theory of international business operations, Hymer (1976) recognizes that 
market power is as the heart of international businesses. Multinational organizations achieve 
their market power as a result of their specific advantage2 embodied in their unique assets and 
not vice versa – their market power is not the cause of existence of their proprietary advantage 
over other firms because the inefficiency stemming from monopoly power would not make 
the maintenance of extra profits possible in the long run (Dunning, 1988). With extra profits 
earned by owning the proprietary advantage, new investments and breakthrough into foreign 
markets are possible.  
 
Lastly, Akamatsu’s “Flying geese” model of development explains how a less developed 
economy can catch-up with more developed economies through international trade (Dunning, 
1988; Kojima, 2000). Import of more sophisticated goods than the less developed economy is 
producing, gradually gives an opportunity to the less developed economy to start the 
                                                 
2 This advantage pertains to monopoly power and can be accomplished on final product markets or input markets 
or can it can be a result of economies of scale, diversification of risk or government support (Blough, 1970: 
1258). Hymer (1976) outlines few routes through which proprietary advantages are realized: a. obtaining lower-
priced inputs, b. knowing how to produce more efficiently and/or strict overseeing of production and c. 
successful distribution and/or differentiated product. 
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production of sophisticated products and, with time, to start exporting them. The levels of 
technological complexity of production as well as the levels of sophistication of the products 
increase with time. Kojima (2000) adds a new dimension to the model with the inclusion of 
FDI in the development process. For him, foreign investments must be oriented towards trade. 
In other words, foreign investor country will move its production to another country to 
strengthen its comparative advantage that has previously been deteriorating in the home 
country. As a consequence, the host country’s economy will grow because it has received new 
technology and capital with the purpose to be employed in the growth of production and 
exports. The result of the foreign investment is beneficial for both home and host country 
because comparative advantages of both countries are enhanced.  
 
Authors of empirical work in the area of growth and FDI mostly rely on endogenous growth 
models as a theoretical starting point and use cross country regression analysis to prove the 
link.  
 
Some of the most prominent authors found the influence of FDI on host economy to be 
dependent on the country’s internal conditions and setting3. Borensztein, De Georgio and Lee 
                                                 
3 Moran (1998: pp. 19-20) summarizes different perspectives of FDI into two dominant views. FDI not only 
brings in additional capital, but also brings along know-how, technology, managerial skills, new resources, all of 
which, according to the benign concept of FDI, can be spilled over to the host economy. Benign concept of FDI 
stipulates that due to foreign investment into capital-labor ratio, labor productivity can be enhanced, which can 
then lead to higher wages. That concept is relevant only if two conditions are satisfied: the industry that the 
foreign investors’ activity belongs to, must have (almost perfect) competition on the global level and free 
competition in that industry must exist in the host economy.  Highly developed economies have better chances of 
capturing all of the benefits coming from FDI because their markets are functioning efficiently – with developed 
systems of suppliers and subcontractors, modern telecommunication networks, national systems of innovation, 
specialized human resources and strong domestic competition. When these conditions of perfect and fee 
competition are not satisfied, the malign conception of FDI, which criticizes behavior of multinational 
enterprises, emerges. The malign conception recognizes that FDI may have negative effects on host economy 
because foreign investor firm is a monopoly or oligopoly on the global level and/or market structure of the host 
economy is imperfect. The critique of multinational enterprises also asserts that these enterprises are able to 
achieve competitive advantages on the global scale because in some developing countries, due to their 
negotiating skills and economic strengths they are able to circumvent health and safety standards, environmental 
laws and legislated minimum wages. The institutional and innovative infrastructure that is either missing or is 
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(1998) show that foreign investments are more important for growth than domestic 
investments (due to the transfer of technology, productivity spillovers etc.) in developing 
economies but only if there is an adequate absorptive capacity within the country, which 
enables efficient reception, transmission and diffusion of new technologies. Absorptive 
capacity thus facilitates the absorption of technology and knowledge spilled over from the 
foreign investment by the domestic agents. It is determined by the accumulated human capital 
of the economically active population in the host country, i.e. on the levels and structure of 
knowledge and skills4.  
 
On the contrary, De Melo (1999), using a sample of OECD members and non-members, finds 
the influence of FDI to be more significant in countries that are technological laggards i.e. 
developing economies. He asserts that the existing domestic technology and foreign 
technology that is introduced are complementary, which occurs because: a. new technology is 
used less efficiently in countries that are technological laggards and/or b. foreign technology 
and knowledge are not more productive or modern than those existing in the host economy.  
 
There have not been many studies focusing specifically on the links between economic 
growth and FDI for CEE, but many researchers did try to identify the factors, amongst them 
FDI, that explain economic growth in the region.  Havrylyshyn, Izvorski and van Rooden 
                                                                                                                                                        
being built in some developing economies, make the potential spillovers improbable. Due to their cost 
advantages over local firms, multinational enterprises are able to keep market concentration in the host economy 
high.  
4 The term “absorptive capacity“ may be expanded from human capital to social capital, but not without 
methodological difficulties. Putnam (1995: p. 67) defines social capital as “features of social organization such 
as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit”. The 
inclusion of social capital is intuitively plausible, because knowledge diffusion and technology transfer crucially 
depend on networks of individuals and institutions that create and reproduce social capital. However, modeling 
social capital in growth equation using cross-country regression is yet impossible because of measurement 
problems and the lack of consistent and/or comparable data, especially on regional and global levels.  
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(1998) conclude on their sample of 25 transition economies, including those in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), that the key determinants of growth in the transition period were 
macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms and lowering public expenditures. FDI has 
influence on growth only when reforms index is excluded from the model, but that influence 
is less significant than that of reforms. Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) make another attempt to find 
the reasons behind different growth patterns across transition economies, again including 
CEE. The main finding is that initial conditions, economic policies along with the 
institutional, legal and political framework are significant factors of growth in the region. By 
employing qualitative approach authors estimate that FDI accounted for economic growth of 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – countries that attracted the highest portion of FDI in 
CEE and economies of which were on average growing by 4 percent or more. In their 
conclusion, authors speculate that FDI may have an effect on growth after conditions 
pertaining to growth have been achieved (after implementing economic stabilization and 
reforms).  
 
Papers focusing specifically on the link between FDI and growth in CEE have started to 
emerge since the early 2000. Fabry (2001) tries to identify the existence of a link between 
FDI, growth and exports by using bi-variate Granger causality testing for ten host countries. 
She detects Granger causality from FDI to economic growth in the case of Albania and 
Russian Federation, while the opposite direction i.e. causality from economic growth to FDI 
is found in the case of Hungary, Poland and Romania. However, Fabry’s conclusion is that 
exports seem to boost growth more than FDI, and in her research it appears that Granger 
causality from FDI to exports simply does not exist. Mencinger (2003) writes a paper with the 
same objective for a sample of eight CEE countries, which joined the EU in 2004. He also 
uses Granger causality test to prove the connection between FDI, economic growth and trade 
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deficit, but with the purpose to use them as a complement to the results of cross-country 
regression growth model based on the Solow’s approach. It appears that the relationship 
between FDI and growth indeed does exist, but it is negative, implying that FDI retards 
economic growth. The author explains that this is caused by takeovers as the main mode of 
entry of foreign investors, as well as the fact that the capital used for buying the firms was 
later directed into consumption and imports, thus failing to raise efficiency. Additionally, the 
negative “competitive” effect, seen as elimination of local competitors because of their 
inability to compete with foreign investment enterprise, might have prevailed. Mencinger also 
regards the sectoral breakdown of FDI as unfavourable – FDI in CEE predominantly flowed 
into (local market oriented) services sector, mostly retail and banking, which might have 
hindered productivity spillovers in smaller economies. Lastly, he attributes the widening of 
current account deficit in the countries to FDI.  
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3. Stylised facts and findings related to FDI in Central and Eastern Europe during 
the period of transition 
 
It is not surprising that most of the CEE countries attempt to attract FDI (over other forms of 
complementing insufficient domestic savings such as foreign debt). Apart from representing 
new capital with a package of management skills, know-how and technology, it has been 
proven that FDI is more stable during economic shocks than other forms of capital such as 
portfolio investment (Ahec-Šonje et al., 2002). Additional benefits from FDI may include 
increase of employment, human resources training, transfer of technology and higher exports. 
Thus, the effects of FDI may substitute some economic and social policy interventions. 
Additionally, foreign investor can help CEE firms raise their competitiveness and integrate 
into the single European market by including local firms into their industrial networks. At the 
moment, many researchers consider that the process of economic integration is not developing 
in the desired direction i.e. that the process of divergence (and not convergence) of CEE with 
the EU is underway (Gristock et al., 2003).  
 
Inflows of FDI have been uneven across the countries in the region with the bulk of the value 
flowing towards the former EU candidates – mostly the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
The main reason behind the uneven distribution of flows may be modes of privatization in 
those countries that allowed foreign capital to enter in early stages of transition (Hunya, 
2002), which stimulated mergers and acquisitions as the dominant mode of entry into CEE. 
Hungary’s model of privatisation has attracted foreign investors more then privatization 
models in other countries because of its effort to attract strategic investors.  
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Since the late 1990es numerous studies, which attempt to reveal the factors determining why 
foreign investors have invested in a certain location/country in the CEE region by using cross-
country regression analysis, have appeared (Resmini, 2000; Babić and Stučka, 2001; Campos 
and Kinoshita, 2003; Bačić, 2004). What most of them had in common is the finding that 
agglomeration5 is important for new investments. New foreign investors seem to have been 
realizing their projects in locations where favourable conditions6 have been made by the 
presence of their counterparts. Bačić (2004), by using a regression analysis, finds that FDI in 
CEE was also motivated by the positive rates of economic growth and by the international 
trade openness of the countries.  That is not surprising: it indicates that foreign investors’ 
interests are twofold. On the one hand, they want to maximize profits and they base their 
expectations on the potential of the prospective markets (usually approximated by purchasing 
power or the size of population in models), and on the other hand, the foregoing exports to the 
host country must be large enough to validate the investment (thereby regarding the cost 
aspect). The finding that the growth rate may influence the flow of investment has an 
implication for the analysis of influence of FDI on economic growth. It indicates the potential 
presence of endogenous determination of variables, suggesting that both the dependent (rate 
of economic growth) and independent variable (FDI) may influence each other or may be 
influenced by the same factors, may be present. That is why the results of the forthcoming 
analysis must be interpreted with reasonable caution.  
 
Another conclusion stemming from these results is that two types of foreign investors 
dominate the region – the market-oriented investors and efficiency-oriented (i.e. cost-
oriented) investors. Identification of the two types of investors makes it possible to tackle the 
                                                 
5 The stock of FDI already accumulated or number of foreign investors already present in a location. These 
locations are, in principle, concentrated in the capitals or big urban centers in the observed economies.  
6 These may be pools of educated human resources, accesses to certain markets, sharing of information etc.   
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assumptions about the possible effects of FDI on growth and the economies. The market - 
oriented investors may develop links with the local suppliers so to minimize costs and 
familiarize themselves with the new market. It is characteristic for this type of investors that 
they prefer to settle in locations where foreign investors are already present because of the 
security that they have created.  
 
The market-oriented investors’ presence may enhance the level of local competition by 
raising the standards of quality and likewise by empowering consumers’ expectations about 
product quality. On the contrary, should the local competition be too weak in terms of 
catching-up with the foreign investor’s enterprise (FIE), it could get completely eliminated 
from the market.  
 
Hunya (2002) stresses the fact that some evidence from the region suggests that local 
entrepreneurs are facing difficulties in obtaining bank loans, so financing of the catching-up 
with FIE in reality might have proven cumbersome. Bačić’s analysis (2004) dismisses the 
geographic diversification of risk (approximated by home country growth rates) as motivation 
for investment into the observed region. In theory, foreign firms may decide to invest abroad 
to overcome the economic troughs that they may be facing at home – but in CEE, economic 
growth is highly dependent on the economic developments in the EU-15 as their key export 
market.  
 
Technological upgrading, considered one of the main advantages of FDI, might have occurred 
in lesser intensity than thought – although this cannot be confirmed because data on transfer 
of technology throughout the region has so far not been collected. If high economic growth in 
the host economies allowed foreign investors to orientate on local markets exclusively, 
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technological upgrading might have been overlooked because of the low levels of 
technological capability of local competitors, at least at the beginning of transition. 
Requirements for higher quality of products were probably more important to foreign 
investors who were export-oriented (Hunya, 2002). In literature, export-oriented investors are 
those who started their business as greenfield projects, while in CEE most of investment fall 
into the (privatization-related) brownfield category. Regardless of the type of investment, 
FIEs are more prone to importing or exporting goods and services than local firms because of 
the nature and structure of multinational enterprises.  
 
Evidence from Hungary shows that FIEs’ contribution to the Hungarian current account 
deficit has been decreasing due to the increasing merchandise exports. Quite the opposite 
happened in Poland, where current account deficit has been widening together with the rising 
share of FIEs in exports and imports (Hunya, 2002).  
 
Breakdown of FDI by activity illustrates a very similar structure in both countries – most of 
FDI flowed into the manufacturing industry, wholesale and retail, transportation, 
telecommunication and financial intermediation - and therefore cannot explain the difference 
in international trade patterns of FIE in Hungary and Poland. Perhaps the difference lies in the 
fact that Hungary attracted more investments that were greenfield, and by definition more 
export-oriented than those in Poland.  
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Table 1: FDI stock breakdown by activities, December 2002, shares in percent 
    Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Hungary Poland Romania Slovak R. Slovenia Average 
                      
National classification 
of activities  
                    
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing  0,3 0,3 0,2 1,1 0,4 0,8 0,3 0,0 0,4  
Industry, total  38,8 37,3 45,4 51,8 38,7 53,7 50,3 44,3  45,0 
  
Mining and 
quarrying 1,2 3,0 1,7 0,3 0,3 . 0,5 0,0  1,0 
  Manufacturing  36,7 33,0 37,6 46,1 35,8 . 37,1 43,3  38,5 
  
Electricity, gas and 
water supply 0,9 1,2 6,1 5,4 2,6 . 12,7 1,0  4,3 
Construction 2,8 1,1 1,5 1,4 2,6 2,7 0,6 0,1  1,6 
Wholesale, retail trade, 
repair of motor 
vehicles 15,0 5,7 15,1 10,6 17,1 16,1 10,7 14,5  13,1 
Hotels and restaurants 1,8 4,2 0,7 1,2 0,6 2,1 0,5 0,4  1,4 
Transportation and 
telecommunications  13,5 26,3 10,4 11,8 10,4 8,5 10,0 4,4  11,9 
Financial 
intermediation 19,4 22,9 14,8 10,6 21,3 . 24,2 18,8  18,9 
Real estate, renting & 
business activities 4,1 1,8 11,4 10,6 7,5 . 2,9 15,2  7,6 
Public admin., defence, 
compul. soc. sec.  . 0,2 . . . . . .   
Education 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 . . . 0,0  0,1 
Health and social work 0,0 . 0,2 0,1 . . 0,0 0,1  0,1 
Oth. community, social 
& personal serv. 0,9 0,2 0,4 0,8 . . 0,4 0,5  0,5 
Oth. not elsewhere 
class. activities 2,9 0,0 . . 1,4 16,1 0,0 1,7  3,7 
                      
Total   100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0   
Total, USD mn 4.454 5.256 27.092 22.203 41.247 8.939 7.580 4.081  120.852 
Source: WIIW, 2003. 
 
Škudar (2002) finds that shares of FIEs in both exports and imports of goods in Croatia are 
about the same, but below the CEE average. However, considering that Croatia’s merchandise 
import is twice the size of its exports, he postulates that FIE by performing their international 
trade activities, contribute to the widening of current account gap. Moreover, FIEs in Croatia 
have recorded rising revenues from exports, while revenues from exports of local firms seem 
to falling. Peculiarity of FDI that has flown into Croatia is that almost 50 percent of total FDI 
has gone into the service sector – transportation and telecommunication, and financial 
intermediation. In other observed economies, this share on average stands at 31 percent. In the 
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Croatian case, it seems that FDI into services have prompted intense links with suppliers and 
subcontractors from the country of investment’s origin more than from the local firms. That 
has possibly hindered productivity spillovers as well as raising the abilities and quality of 
local firms. The other explanation is that FIE in Croatia might have manipulated transfer 
pricing in order to repatriate profits to a larger extent than in other countries.  Profit may 
instead of “outflow of income” be transferred abroad as loan repayment (to parent company), 
payment of services and goods (to home country suppliers or parent company), etc. By doing 
this, FIE will be charged with less tax, which gives FIE cost advantage over local firms. Šonje 
and Vujčić (2001) demonstrate in their model that the welfare of the host country will 
increase even if profit is 100 percent repatriated only if the value of exports created from FDI 
is greater than the repatriated profit.  
 
Market structure and strength, as well as and activity breakdown of FDI are important for 
determinants of competing between local firms and FIEs. According to the data on FDI stock 
in CEE in December 2002, on average 38.5 percent of the stock is invested in the 
manufacturing industry. Financial intermediation, falling into the category of services, 
attracted by far the most of FDI with almost 19 percent share in total, followed by whole- and 
retail-sales (13.1 percent) and transportation and telecommunication (11.9 percent). It is 
exactly these activities that have been growing most strongly during the transition period.  
Possible explanation for that situation may be that foreign investors have entered prospective 
firms and activities. Alternatively, foreign investors might have spurred growth of the 
activities they entered or propulsive sectors underwent expansion and were targeted by 
foreign investors simultaneously. Apart from noticing the progressiveness of FIE activities, it 
is noticeably that foreign investors have entered some bigger monopolistic or oligopolistic 
firms-in particularly the telecommunication (in some of its segments) and the banking sector.  
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Some capital-demanding privatisations have been planned and carried out separately from the 
ongoing privatisation processes. Apart from thereby trying to maintain social consensus (with 
the goal to keep the employment high), many governments also decided to sell off big firms to 
help cover budget deficit with the revenues from the sales. Often in those separate processes 
with government acting as the seller, the highest offer was the main criterion, while the future 
business plans made by prospective buyer came secondary.  The result of those sales may be 
delay of restructuring or lower capital investments in general. Hunya (2002) might have 
referred to those sales or sales of monopolistic firms when he wrote about the «hot» 
opportunities that foreign investors seized. When firms that had previously not been 
restructured were being sold, their price might have been underestimated. Those are, in 
particular, firms with often obsolete technology and managerial issues usually facing 
problems of illiquidity or insolvency that require immediate investments. The potential of 
those firms normally lies in their access to certain market or markets.  
 
Generally, automobile and electronics industry received by far the most of FDI across the 
region (except in Croatia and Bulgaria) – UNCTAD in 2003 reports that these investments 
continue to grow mostly contributing to the restructuring of activities toward higher value 
added. Products of these industries are launched globally. The FDI into the automobile 
industry in the Czech Republic has created a web of subcontractors and spinning off in local 
firms. Locating of these industries in CEE is vitally important for receiving countries because 
of the possibility of FIE helping integrate local firms into international industrial networks. 
Additionally, those industries are by definition more export-oriented than other types of FDI.  
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Krkoska (2001) reports that restructuring of firms taken over by foreign owners has been 
more frequent than in firms owned by residents. In more than 70 percent of cases, FIE 
upgraded their technology, which must have improved firm's efficiency. In comparison, local 
firms upgraded their technology on average in less than 55 percent of cases. That is why it is 
not surprising that indicators of firms' success such as profitability for FIEs are double to 
three times that of local firms (Konings, 2001; Hunya, 2002; Škudar, 2002). The only 
decision made both by FIE and local firms that is equally frequent is the decision about 
reducing the number of employees - a decision that is least demanding in respect to other 
business decisions such as upgrading of technology or managerial practices (Krkoska, 2001).  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative USD value of FDI per capita (x) in the period 1993-2002 and firm restructuring in 2003 
(EBRD index) 
EBRD index of  enterprise restructuing= 2,5151+0,0006*x
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r2 = 0,64;  r = 0,7978, p = 0,0000006;  y  = 2,51 + 0,0006*x
Source: Authors calculations made after figure from Krkoska (2001: p. 9).  Data was taken from 
UNCTAD CD-ROM, 2003 and EBRD, 2003.  
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Data on employment in FIEs in several CEE in the years 1998 and 1999 reveals that FIEs’ 
share in total employment was 2.5 and 2.7 percent, respectively.  Interestingly, employment in 
FIEs between those years rose regardless of ongoing recessions in host economies (in the 
midst of the “Russian crisis”) and the global economic turbulence coupled with the fact that 
total employment in half of those economies fell. That situation must have been a result of 
FIEs’ strong competitive position in the host country market or exporting markets. If that was 
the case, it might support the idea of the existence of enclaves i.e. a group of progressive 
firms, more successful than the rest of the economy, and in this case, composed of FIEs7.  
 
Halpern and Kőrösi (2001) present evidence from Hungarian manufacturing industry 
asserting that FIE are in a better position to exploit market imperfections and earn extra profit. 
They see differences in corporate efficiency as an explanation because it can influence the 
ability to exploit market imperfections. Zukowska-Gagelman (2000) tackles the issue of rising 
of two-tier economy in Poland, where FIE are dominating the economy while domestic 
enterprises are only trying to catch-up.  Similar occurrence is marked in Hungary by Hamar 
(2001) who reports of the signals of dual economic development first noted in 1996. Since 
then local firms have improved their exporting capabilities and productivity, but the gap 
between local firms and FIEs’ performance in 1999, Hamar writes, has not vanished but, in 
fact, has widened.  
 
The arrival of multinational enterprises into transition countries has led to some integration of 
local firms into global production networks (Linden, 1998; Van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998; 
Kaminski and Smarzynska, 2001). However, the benefits of multinationals-centred networks 
                                                 
7 An additional assumption about enclaves is that they no not interact with local firms, and restrict themselves to 
the use of local resources only where necessary.  
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accruing to domestic enterprises have often been narrow. The networks being built are often 
restricted to the multinational firms’ subsidiaries with limited local subcontracting (cf. 
Radosevic, 2002). Integration into international networks, upgrading of quality and efficiency 
are perceived as main goals of local firms when cooperating with FIEs. The integration of 
local suppliers into the multinational enterprises’ global production networks has so far been 
mostly limited to low-value added activities (Linden, 1998; Van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998; 
Dunin-Wasowitz, Gorzynsky and Woodward, 2002). Capability enhancements and 
technology transfer benefits accruing to domestic companies partnering with multinational 
enterprises on innovative projects is limited (Sadowski, 2001), and usually restricted to  FIE 
(cf. Biegelbauer, Griebler, and Leuthold, 2001). 
 
Hungary - as a small open economy with high inflows of FDI since the onset of transition is a 
good example for identifying various types of cooperation between local firms and FIEs. 
Szanyi (2002) writes that in the Hungarian case, cooperation between local firms and FIEs 
began in the early stage of transition and that its nature and intensity depended on FIEs’ 
parent company global strategy. An estimate was made that FIEs cooperated with 10-20 
percent of local medium sized firms with the purpose to service local and foreign markets. It 
is due to this cooperation that local value-added increased. Local firms were mostly confined 
to the production of intermediary products (components production and subcontracting). 
Szanyi also provides an extensive overview of different authors’ points of view according to 
which the cooperation between local firms and FIEs has negative consequences for those local 
firms. According to those views, subcontractors become isolated from the rest of the national 
economy and FIE and/or do not transfer enough technology. There is also the possibility that 
subcontractors may lose their R&D functions and thereby neglect their own product 
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development. This is not the case with local firms that act as suppliers and manufacture their 
own products.  
 
Effects of FDI on productivity spillovers in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania for 5000 firms in 
the period of 1993-1997 were explored by Konings (2001). He finds that FIE are more 
successful than local firms only in Poland, while he explains the lack of success over local 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania by the fact that FIE devoted that period to restructuring. The 
author did not find evidence of positive spillovers in any of the economies. However, he did 
find negative spillovers in Bulgaria and Romania due to the prevalence of competitive effect8 
over positive technological or productivity spillover. Spillovers from FIEs to local firms are 
also researched by Smarzynska (2002), but for Lithuania. While she finds that there were 
positive productivity spillovers in downstream production (suppliers, contractors), she finds 
none horizontally-in the industry that FIE belonged to. Productivity spillovers were associated 
with (host country) market-oriented FIEs and not with export-oriented FIEs. Zukowska-
Gagelman (2000) finds that in Poland, FIEs’ share in employment, ownership structure and 
invested capital have strengthened in nearly all industries. Rise in labor productivity in FIE 
was higher than the rise in overall productivity. Zukowska-Gagelman estimates that FIEs are 
twice more productive than local firms, and explains that there is trend of shrinking that gap 
in productivity because of laying off in local firms. In cases where competing with FIEs has 
provoked restructuring of local firms, that restructuring was mostly defensive and short-term. 
Overall, higher presence of FIE in an industry seems to affect local firms negatively. The 
author detected a negative impact of FIEs on local firms’ performance in highly competitive 
                                                 
8 FIEs' effort to crowd out local competition. The attempt may prove possible because of local firms’ inability to 
compete with FIEs-technologically, in financing, in efficiency or managerial practices.  
 21 
industries, while in the least productive state firms in low competition industries, the effects 
on productivity is positive.  
 
It seems that, at the level of stylized facts, the extent of spillovers from FIE onto local firms 
that would spur economic growth in CEE has been limited. That may have occurred due to 
competitive advantages and strategic behaviour of FIE, as well as to the limited capacity of 
host countries to utilize the opportunities provided and spread them throughout the domestic 
economy. For example, problems with transmission and application of knowledge remain 
widespread even in the most advanced CEE countries (cf. Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 2002). 
In the next section, we undertake a quantitative analysis to explore the relationship between 
FDI and growth in CEE. 
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4. Quantitative Analysis of Effects of FDI on Economic Growth in CEE 
 
4.1. Data, sample and statistical indicators 
The sample of countries for analysis of importance of FDI for growth consists of 11 transition 
economies in CEE: eight countries that have integrated into the EU in May 2004 (the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia) and three 
countries of the second wave of accession to the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). Period 
under observation is 1994-2002 because between those years all of the economies have started 
to recover from the “transition shock” and have started to record positive rates of economic 
growth. That, along with simultaneous inflow of FDI into the region and similar economic 
structures, makes the sample homogenous9.  
 
Slovenia, among the countries in the sample, exhibits the most persistently high growth rate 
of 4.1 percent with only 0.9 percent of deviation from its average value. That is not case with 
average FDI inflows into Slovenia –they are not above the sample’s average, and their 
deviation from the average inflow is significant. Nonpersistent FDI inflows into Slovenia may 
be the first sign that in the course of the observed period high and robust rates of economic 
growth cannot directly be credited to FDI inflows.  Low correlation coefficient for economic 
growth and FDI confirms that doubt. Bulgaria, on the other hand, stands out as the country 
with the least persistent growth rate (on average 0.9 percent) with high deviation from its 
average value. Bulgaria has on average received more FDI inflows than Slovenia, which were 
also more stable than the ones flowing into Slovenia. The most obvious outstanding candidate 
                                                 
9 Some differences in the level of development among countries are more obvious when the level of GDP per 
capita is taken into consideration. Majority of those countries (8 of them) belong to medium income range 
(2000-4999 USD per capita), while Slovenia (upper higher income 5.000-19.999), and Romania and Bulgaria 
(lower income 500 1.999 USD) do not fall into that category.   
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for determining the existence of relationship between growth and FDI is Latvia because of its 
positive rates of growth and persistent inflows of FDI. That is why its correlation coefficient 
for economic growth and FDI is high (0.9). However, the high value of correlation coefficient 
may point to the problem of endogenous determination of variables. FDI itself may be 
influenced by innovations and other factors characteristic for processes that provoke 
economic growth (USITC, 1997).   
 
Table 2: Time series with annual data for real rate of economic growth (rGDP) and FDI inflows (FDI, 
USD millions)  
1994-2002 Est Slo Lit Lat Cro Slk Bul Hun Czk Rom Pol 
Average FDI inflow 236 201 114 139 182 199 61 212 391 42 137 
Standard deviation 107 283 85 51 119 235 42 104 273 25 56 
Average growth 4. 2 4. 1 2. 2 4.0 4. 3 4. 3 0. 6 3. 6 2. 1 1. 2 4. 5 
Standard deviation 3. 7 0. 9 5. 5 3. 3 2. 3 1. 8 5. 6 1. 4 2. 8 4. 8 2. 1 
  Value of correlation coefficient 1992-2002 
Growth, FDI 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 
Growth, FDI (t-1) 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 
Growth (t-1), FDI 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Source: Authors' calculations, data taken from EBRD Transition Report 2003 and World Investment 
Report 2003 – Statistical Annex (UNCTAD). 
 
In the table 1 countries are positioned by the size of its population. Within the observed 
sample, in smaller countries, correlation coefficients for economic growth and FDI are 
positive, while it is opposite for larger countries (Hungary, Romania and Poland) – with the 
exception of the Czech Republic where correlation is weak.  
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  Table 3: Main statistical indicators of FDI (million, USD per capita) and countries’ GDP growth rates in 
cross section  
 
Average FDI 
inflow 
Standard  
deviation 
Average real rate 
of GDP 
Standard 
deviation 
Correlation 
coefficient 
1994 60,2 46,6 1,9 4,5 -0,02 
1995 111,3 132,7 4,4 2,6 -0,25 
1996 98,1 65,3 3,0 4,8 0,27 
1997 129,7 63,3 3,7 5,8 0,57 
1998 196,6 111,6 2,7 3,4 0,08 
1999 191,6 163,1 0,9 3,0 -0,16 
2000 208,2 131,4 4,3 1,7 -0,18 
2001 234,2 154,4 4,3 1,7 -0,30 
2002 337,0 346,5 3,5 0,8 -0,10 
1994 – 02 174,1 135,0 3,2 3,2 -0,01 
Source: Authors’ calculations, data taken from EBRD Transition Report 2003 and World Investment 
Report 2003 – Statistical Annex (UNCTAD). 
 
Cross section data (table 2) do not provide a clearer picture of the observed relationship. After 
the recovery from the transition shock, positive rates of economic growth begin to slowdown 
towards 1999, when most of the economies from the sample are hit by the Russian financial 
crisis. Since then, rates of economic growth have stabilized at precrisis level and their 
nonpersistence weakens. The year 1999 marks a turning point in the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth. In the period 1996-1998, countries with higher growth rates were at the 
same time countries that attracted higher inflows of FDI, suggesting that foreign investors 
were more attracted to countries that grew progressively. On the other hand, those countries’ 
growth can be a result of effects of FDI.   
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Figure 2: Regression line within 95% confidence bands for real growth rate and average annual FDI 
inflow per capita in the period 1994-2002 for  27 transition economies  
growth = 2,3775+0,0051*FDI
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Figure 3:  Regression line within 95% confidence bands for real growth rate and average annual FDI 
inflow per capita in the period 1994-2002 for  11 transition economies  
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Source: Authors calculations, data taken from IFS IMF-CDROM and different editions of EBRD 
Transition Report. 
 
Result of a simple regression with average growth rates (of 27 transition economies) as 
dependent variable and average FDI inflows (in USD) as explanatory variable, shows that that 
on average countries grew by 2.4 percent (the constant) and that nearly 2 percent of variation 
in growth can be explained by the difference in FDI flows. Dollar value of FDI increases 
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growth, but not strongly since its coefficient is close to zero. If the sample is narrowed to the 
11 economies under observation plus Macedonia, almost identical result is obtained, but only 
with higher percentage in variation of growth attributed to changes in FDI – 11.4 percent.  
 
4.2. Testing of causality  
Although the question “does a change in one variable cause a change in another variable in a 
relationship founded in economic theory?” has implicitly been posed, the answer has yet not 
been given because it must be found in determining existence of causality. Additionally, 
strength of the relationship may be examined with correlation coefficient. Fabry (2001) and 
Mencinger (2003) try to find the answer to the relevant question for FDI and rate of economic 
growth by using Ganger causality test. They use annual data for the transition period with 
lagged FDI.  Fabry (2001) uses annual data with lagged FDI for countries individually, while 
Mencinger (2003) uses cross section data for 8 eight countries that have integrated into the 
EU in May 2004 and tests the causality for the whole sample. Although Fabry produces 
results for individual countries, a low number of her observations may be problematic. 
Mencinger’s approach assumes the same pattern of causality for the whole sample, but his test 
results appear more reliable.  
 
The general weakness of Granger causality test is that it does not produce the sign (positive 
vs. negative) of the relationship between variables, and Fabry (2001) solves this problem by 
introducing correlation coefficient to complement the findings of the test. Granger causality is 
tested for two variables, where if the second variable provides information about the first 
variable in the presence of lagged first variable, then “the second variable Granger causes the 
first variable”. Causality is tested in both directions, from first to the second variable direction 
and in the opposite direction.  
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In order to Granger test the countries from the sample, quarterly FDI, merchandise exports 
(MG) and imports (XG) and nominal GDP (all in USD) data for the period 1993-2002 is used, 
thus making series of 35-38 observations on average. Bivariate causality is tested for each 
country individually, with lags (signified by “p”) varying from 2-8 (i.e. from 6 to 24 months). 
The wide range of lags allows for the possibility that the effects of FDI in various economies 
may disperse unequally fast/slow, as well as the possibility to capture the effects of FDI might 
have not been registered promptly in the official statistics. The dependant variable is also 
included in the equation as a lagged variable in order to capture the systematic changes in the 
series. Of the hypothesis Ho is rejected, then Granger causality is present.  
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The goal of the testing is to explain whether changes in FDI inflows cause changes in level of 
GDP, merchandise exports and imports. FDI directly complements fixed capital formation if 
it comes in the form of greenfield investment, and may indirectly affect growth if it changes 
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exports and imports-and it should as theory and empirical evidence suggest that. Reverse 
causality in the test will help to find out whether the problem of endogenous determination of 
variables is present. That problem is in regression (that is to follow) normally solved by using 
lagged FDI values, logarithmic values of GDP and by introducing more explanatory variables 
in the equation (USITC, 1997).  
Table 4: Granger bivariate causality test results for FDI as an explanatory variable 
Variable lagged at 
t-2, ... , t-8             
(explanatory variable) 
FDI 
Variable at t              
(dependant variable) 
GDP Merchandise exports  Merchandise imports  
Countries 
Presence of 
causality 
(and the sign 
of cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at which 
causality is 
present  
Presence of 
causality 
(and the 
sign of cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at 
which 
causality is 
present 
Presence of 
causality 
(and the sign 
of cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at which 
causality is 
present 
Croatia      
The Czech R.      
Bulgaria      
Slovenia      
Slovakia      
Estonia      
Lithuania      
Latvia      
Hungary      
Poland      
Romania n.a.     
 
No. of countries with 
established presence of 
causality  
3 4 8 
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Table 5: Granger bivariate causality test results for GDP, merchandise exports and imports as 
explanatory variables 
Variable lagged at 
t-2, ... , t-8             
(explanatory variable) 
GDP Merchandise exports  Merchandise imports  
Variable at t              
(dependant variable) 
FDI 
Countries 
Presence of 
causality 
(and the sign 
of cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at which 
causality is 
present  
Presence of 
causality 
(and the 
 sign of  
cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at 
which 
causality is 
present 
Presence of 
causality 
(and the sign 
of cross 
correlation 
coefficient 
 
Lags at which 
causality is 
present 
Croatia      
The Czech R.      
Bulgaria      
Slovenia      
Slovakia      
Estonia      
Lithuania      
Latvia      
Hungary      
Poland      
Romania n.a.     
 
No. of countries with 
established presence of 
causality 
4 5 7 
Source: Quarterly data from IFS IMF-CDROM, web-sites of central banks and national statistical offices. 
Remark: data for Polish exports and imports include services. 
 
The test results presented in table 3 show that lagged FDI (by 9-15 months) Granger caused 
changes in GDP levels of Slovenia, Slovakia and Lithuania. The established link is most 
robust in Lithuania because of positive and high correlation coefficient, whereas in Slovenia it 
is positive, but at the same time low. Slovakia’s results are inconclusive because the 
established relationship on lags 5-7 carries both negative and positive signs, and coupled with 
that, the link is not strong.   The results in table 4 point to the possible existence of the 
problem of endogenous determination of variables because apart from “FDI Granger causing 
GDP”, results show that “GDP Granger causes FDI”. All thee economies with the established 
relationships are opened and rather small which opens the possibility that the effects of FDI 
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may be stronger in smaller economies with possibly less diversified or complex economic 
structure.   
 
FDI Granger causes changes in international trade flows in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary, and in all cases the relationship is positive. The problem of endogenous 
determination of variable emerges in the Estonian case. However, Granger causality 
stemming from FDI to merchandise imports is most strongly present, having been established 
in eight countries, implying that FIE have been strongly using their parent companies’ or 
home country suppliers services or products and were probably strongly contributing to the 
widening of current account deficit.  
No causality stemming from FDI was found in Croatia and Poland’s case, but there was the 
opposite causality – coming from international merchandise flows to FDI. Merchandise 
imports (which strongly correlate with merchandise exports) have Granger caused FDI in 7 
countries and those high imports may be interpreted as a cost argument for market-oriented 
investors to invest in the observed countries.  
 
4.3. Production function 
Results of the Granger causality test will supplement the results of production function of 
similar to the one used by Mencinger (2003) in his research with general specification: 
 
rGDP = f (pcGDP, rINV, rEMP, FDI, rEU),  
 
where rGDP signifies rates of economic growth, pcGDP initial conditions, rINV rate of 
domestic investments, rEMP rate of employment, and rEU rate of growth of EU-15. The 
difference between Mencinger’s model and the one used in this paper is that there are no 
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country dummy variables in the outlined model. Method used to test the equation is pool 
regression with cross section weights (CSW). CSW should allow for a better fit of the 
regression.  
 
Table 6: Results of regression of production function for the period 1994-2002  
 
Basic 
model 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5 Model-6* 
Const. 
1.8 
(3.17) 
0.9 
(1.05) 
1.79 
(3.21) 
0.93 
(1.14) 
1.79 
(3.34) 
0.71 
(0.90) 
3.77 
(3.37) 
pcGDP 
6.64E-05 
(0.85) 
9.17E-05 
(1.05) 
6.89E-05 
(0.87) 
8.71E-05 
(1.12) 
-3.58E-06 
(-0.05) 
2.25E-05 
(0.31) 
-0.0001 
(-1.54) 
rINV 
0.16 
(8.83) 
0.16 
(8.94) 
0.16 
(8.81) 
0.16 
(8.85) 
0.14 
(7.2) 
0.13 
(7.27) 
0.09 
(3.87) 
rEMP 
0.25 
(2.64) 
0.25 
(2.77) 
0.25 
(2.67) 
0.26 
(2.81) 
0.21 
(2.29) 
0.22 
(2.40) 
0.34 
(2.67) 
EUgrowth . 
0.33 
(1.49) 
. 
0.32 
(1.45) 
. 
0.37 
(1.80) 
0.32 
(1.32) 
FDI (-1) 
0.0001 
(1.22) 
0.0001 
(1.3') 
. . 
3.02E-05 
(0.39) 
1.19E-05 
(0.09) 
-0.0005 
(-2.34) 
FDI . . 
0.0001 
(1.37) 
0.0001 
(1.45) 
. 
3.73E-05 
(0.31) 
. 
rGDP(-1) . . . . 
0.22 
(3.27) 
0.22 
(3.34) 
. 
R2 
R2, adj. 
 
0.72 
0.71 
 
0.74 
0.72 
 
0.73 
0.71 
 
0.74 
0.73 
 
0.77 
0.76 
 
0.79 
0.77 
 
0.82 
0.87 
 
* Sample composed of countries in which «FDI Granger cause GDP or merchandise exports»:  
Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary.  
Remark: T-statistics are within brackets. 
 
In the basic model, the constant equals long-term average growth rate of 11 economies in the 
sample – and is significant in the specifications where its value is above 1. The main result of 
the analysis is that changes growth can be explained by the rise in domestic investments and 
employment, and these variables are robust in all specifications of the equation. Lagged FDI, 
initial conditions and growth in EU-15 turn out insignificant. When the sample is reduced to 
the economies identified as those where FDI has Granger caused either growth or exports or 
both (Model 6*), lagged FDI becomes significant and has negative influence on growth, but 
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its strength is negligible (because its coefficient is close to zero). Though the sample is too 
small for the results to be reliable, the results are consistent with the results of the basic model 
– with the constant, domestic investments and employment remaining the significant 
explanatory variables.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Overview of the recent empirical evidence together with pool regression results strongly 
suggests that the role of FDI in capital formation was negligible. Had FDI complemented host 
countries’ fixed investments more strongly, the results would have reflected in higher rate of 
economic growth (see regression models 2, 3 and 5). That finding supports the fact that most 
of FDI has flown in the region in the form of brownfield investments.  If those FDI inflows 
had come in the form of greenfield investments, the results on the economy would have 
automatically been visible in higher growth rate. More importantly, presence of positive 
indirect effects of FDI after the initial year of investment is not confirmed for the whole 
sample (see basic model and models 4 and 5). However, the results of Granger causality test, 
which enable individual approach to economies, imply that the growth rates of three open and 
small economies - the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania – have been positively 
influenced by FDI. Perhaps the explanation to this influence lies in their economic structures 
that are probably less complex and less diversified than those in big economies 
simultaneously more receptive to spillovers. When the sample (see regression model 6) is 
restricted to five economies in which presence of FDI influence on growth and exports was 
established, influence of lagged FDI on growth appears, and is negative. Although the 
restricted sample is too small to provide any conclusive results, a cautious conclusion may 
still be made. The indirect negative effects of FDI achieved through trade and competing with 
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local firms seems to overweight the positive direct effect on capital formation in those 
countries.  
 
Furthermore, influence of FDI is strong in international trade of the observed economies, and 
mostly so in rising merchandise import levels. Evidence of FIEs’ activity contributing to the 
goods exports is less present in the sample. That is why these results confirm the notion that 
FIEs are contributing to the widening of current account deficit widening in several of the 
observed economies. High shares non-export oriented FDI, mostly flown into the services 
sector, can account for that development. Those results also imply that FIEs were probably 
extensively using their home country suppliers’ and/or parent company’ services or goods. By 
doing so, apart from limiting cooperation with local firms, transfer-pricing manipulation as a 
mechanism of retrieving pre-taxed profits was more likely to occur. Positive spillovers in the 
form of productivity enhancement on the level of FIEs’ activity, in downstream and upstream 
production were more likely to occur in larger economies, economic structure of which 
probably had more local competition and a wider choice of local suppliers and subcontractors. 
However, those effects are probably less significant on the level of the whole economy, with 
no consequences on the growth rate. Empirical literature suggests that productivity 
enhancements were narrowed to FIEs mostly. Likewise, technological upgrading of both FIEs 
and local suppliers and subcontractors might have only occurred in the economies that 
received the high shares of FDI in export-oriented international activities such as electronics 
or automobile production. In other dominant FDI shares such as retail trade or finance, 
competing with local firms was more pronounced. The available findings that confirm that 
FIEs in few of the observed economies were more successful than local firms imply that those 
host economies have already become two-tier economies.  
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a. Data sources 
 
 IMF International Finance Statistics 2003, CDROM. 
 The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) Database, CDROM.  
 UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, CDROM. 
 Transition Report Update 2002: Economic Transition in central and eastern Europe, the 
Baltic States and the CIS, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May). 
 Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Cooperation, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (http://www.oecd.org/home/).  
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Appendix 1.  
 
Table 7: Results of Granger causality test 
Hungary 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 2  1.83551  0.17415 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.07980  0.92347 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 3  1.54176  0.22207 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.13084  0.94106 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 4  1.61139  0.19714 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.11275  0.97706 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 5  2.77562  0.03783 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.89161  0.50051 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 6  2.01868  0.10246 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.04152  0.42365 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 7  1.66925  0.17115 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.04754  0.42935 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 8  1.45404  0.24152 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 
 0.60855  0.75928 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 2  1.30011  0.28499 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.00296  0.99704 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 3  0.91305  0.44527 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.00340  0.99972 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 4  0.73469  0.57558 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.14566  0.96351 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 5  0.93529  0.47396 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.51404  0.76323 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 6  0.89171  0.51651 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.74764  0.61716 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 7 0.64991 0.71053 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 1.41955 0.24963 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 8  0.86081  0.56515 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  
 1.38211  0.26912 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.05056 0.15486 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.31244  0.73517 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.97785 0.15558 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.80709  0.50720 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.52923 0.71630 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.51915  0.72318 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.61734 0.68971 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.78048  0.58409 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.56788 0.74672 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.85090  0.56595 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.31181 0.91974 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.56852  0.15818 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.70157 0.42209 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.08618  0.56334 Accept 
 
Bulgaria 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  0.00263 0.99738 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.32278  0.72627 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.05239 0.98389 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.19980  0.89575 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.26215 0.89980 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.36050  0.83461 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.20223 0.95862 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.76640  0.58238 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.57067 0.74944 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.74850  0.61678 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.65959 0.70293 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.76147  0.62527 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.45145 0.87305 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.73934  0.65715 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  0.06364 0.93845 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.28295  0.02168 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.13628 0.93765 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.09562  0.01440 Reject 
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  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.53649 0.71002 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.84870  0.14651 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.64641 0.66662 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.30475  0.29254 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.11660 0.38342 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.12047  0.38138 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.03502 0.43831 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.07137  0.41678 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.91625 0.52666 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.48748  0.84855 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 27  0.25709 0.77559 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.12896  0.34140 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 26  0.30997 0.81791 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.16730  0.34825 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 25  1.63972 0.21298 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.87397  0.50099 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 24  1.96187 0.15194 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.50952  0.76440 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 23  1.81337 0.19346 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.91407  0.52267 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 22  1.01829 0.49077 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.59713  0.74370 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 21  1.49614 0.36821 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.04507  0.51975 Accept 
 
 
The Czech Republic  
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.57834 0.09380 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.48282  0.24428 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.54893 0.22658 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.96536  0.42454 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.14557 0.36138 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.76699  0.55810 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.84331 0.53580 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.54312  0.22382 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.80032 0.58372 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.40105  0.27382 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.73902 0.64432 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.13185  0.40118 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.91258 0.54268 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.40051  0.30313 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  0.78849 0.46436 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.14266  0.05871 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.84667 0.48141 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.93334  0.15002 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.79716 0.53982 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.40646  0.26469 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.55451 0.73322 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.11857  0.10748 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.68085 0.66754 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.80871  0.16070 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.62615 0.72667 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.67813  0.19937 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.76453 0.64118 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.03209  0.14546 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 2  0.44720 0.64390 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  0.57054  0.57166 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 3  1.13421 0.35435 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  2.50330  0.08235 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 4  1.12703 0.36938 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  1.46283  0.24735 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 5  0.31158 0.89987 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  1.32011  0.29768 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 5  0.10241 0.99501 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  1.09115  0.40888 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 7  0.15031 0.99103 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  1.73046  0.18655 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 8  0.45048 0.86452 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI  1.86069  0.17653 Accept 
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Estonia 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  3.30038 0.05018 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  10.3582  0.00036 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  4.42391 0.01147 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  7.61046  0.00071 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.90768 0.04192 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  5.80398  0.00191 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  3.56121 0.01646 Reject  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  4.65562  0.00475 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  2.61704 0.05074 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  3.65194  0.01397 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  2.28088 0.08154 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.11161  0.10223 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  2.37503 0.07996 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.46217  0.07188 Reject 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  4.12588 0.02578 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  7.67935  0.00195 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  5.00995 0.00662 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.85793  0.00762 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  3.43412 0.02279 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.97400  0.00434 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  4.20260 0.00784 Reject  
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.09108  0.02912 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  3.16061 0.02535 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.02775  0.11177 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  3.01236 0.03210 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.36531  0.28495 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  2.72101 0.05276 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.08824  0.11453 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.46947 0.10287 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.22930  0.79657 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.84209 0.16537 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.83419  0.48777 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.59817 0.21016 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.23639  0.91478 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.23587 0.33125 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.05503  0.99775 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.15851 0.37518 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.29601  0.92996 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.36385 0.29823 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.36488  0.90698 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.88629 0.17145 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.93138  0.53097 Accept 
 
 
Lithuania 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  3.67471 0.03827 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.79159  0.18528 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  5.98441 0.00321 Reject  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.85839  0.16251 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  3.88121 0.01561 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.25992  0.31547 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  4.74977 0.00554 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.68618  0.63972 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  3.31267 0.02579 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.15210  0.10338 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  3.86845 0.01705 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.82744  0.58255 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  2.82620 0.06330 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.93418  0.52925 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  4.50955 0.02006 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  6.75706  0.00403 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  5.57807 0.00452 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.04373  0.01792 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  3.70494 0.01881 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.86440  0.00579 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  3.00401 0.03655 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.38837  0.07676 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  2.81737 0.04567 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.59142  0.21339 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  2.10612 0.11680 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.49747  0.07320 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  2.43334 0.09426 Reject 
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  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.20205  0.04428 Reject 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  3.09845 0.06087 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.32224  0.11665 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  3.25804 0.03830 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.68211  0.06848 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.87924 0.14990 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  4.40291  0.00914 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.93467 0.13564 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.62622  0.05736 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.45150 0.25632 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.75108  0.17321 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.27555 0.33403 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.57877  0.22632 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.92380 0.53567 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.06010  0.45625 Accept 
 
 
Latvia 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.03869 0.14908 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  6.18497  0.00596 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.01263 0.40367 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  3.17690  0.04151 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.55224 0.22211 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.22578  0.09924 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.24208 0.32866 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.54320  0.22380 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.06243 0.42404 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.89318  0.52288 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.93414 0.51299 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.61310  0.06404 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.74901 0.20077 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.30739  0.10769 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  1.84341 0.17697 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.55607  0.22866 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.19249 0.33281 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.53312  0.23047 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.55487 0.06753 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.63908  0.06127 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.77001 0.16734 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.99315  0.44802 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.51658 0.23537 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.61477  0.05823 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.09604 0.41974 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.15847  0.10958 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.76137 0.64338 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.93869  0.16155 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  1.81872 0.18088 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.35823  0.27354 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.52221 0.67095 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.92844  0.44154 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.47625 0.07398 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.98845  0.43439 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.96656 0.13025 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.15866  0.36507 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  2.47408 0.06914 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.82143  0.56951 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  2.69830 0.05811 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.96547  0.49376 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  5.30191 0.00845 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.77753  0.63212 Accept 
 
 
Poland  
FDI and total exports (EX), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 2  5.16106 0.01054 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  2.06205  0.14156 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 3  3.35523 0.03007 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  1.28093  0.29656 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.69838 0.17552 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  0.74244  0.57040 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.57062 0.20076 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  1.36768  0.26627 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.92055 0.49692 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  1.68225  0.16689 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.73400 0.64568 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  1.48983  0.22226 Accept 
  EX does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.78049 0.62500 Accept 
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  FDI does not Granger Cause EX  1.15048  0.37658 Accept 
FDI and total imports (IM), hypothesis:     
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 2  6.96359 0.00271 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  0.83316  0.44266 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 3  3.83526 0.01814 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  0.96377  0.42104 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.43688 0.06798 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  1.03509  0.40488 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.37847 0.26233 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  1.15421  0.35594 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.79649 0.58161 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  1.09873  0.39061 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.64015 0.71824 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  1.30053  0.29601 Accept 
  IM does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.56393 0.79411 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause IM  1.13029  0.38788 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  1.24616 0.30802 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.53893  0.59123 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.91649 0.45272 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.34524  0.79297 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.20177 0.35060 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.97146  0.15078 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.37497 0.85633 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.79660  0.18805 Accept 
 
 
Romania 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 2  1.76134 0.18759 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  2.62098  0.08781 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 3  1.96596 0.14035 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.48559  0.23839 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 4  1.37945 0.26734 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.81778  0.52512 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 5  1.93872 0.12499 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.39714  0.26076 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 6  1.43812 0.24723 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.11492  0.38710 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 7  1.29942 0.30585 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.99248  0.46741 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG 8  1.11451 0.40685 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.02874  0.45685 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  4.51322 0.01851 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.53608  0.04060 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  3.76341 0.02095 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.39895  0.08752 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  3.16774 0.02946 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.48098  0.23560 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  2.24031 0.08307 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.30565  0.29474 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.61867 0.19136 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.99695  0.45298 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.17041 0.36671 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.91022  0.52057 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.97599 0.12164 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.01749  0.46376 Accept 
 
 
The Slovak Republic 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.02288 0.15336 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.19618  0.82311 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.90777 0.45326 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.25560  0.85651 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.58716 0.67587 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.28332  0.88513 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.06976 0.41317 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.31690  0.89555 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.93223 0.50415 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.42327  0.85069 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.30852 0.33778 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.68351  0.21940 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.12568 0.44446 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GX  1.91711  0.20312 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 2  1.42380 0.25966 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.74558  0.19515 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 3  2.13126 0.12522 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.90456  0.45479 Accept 
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  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 4  0.89028 0.48875 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.61792  0.65512 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 5  0.82905 0.54747 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.43490  0.81771 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 6  1.80987 0.17397 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  0.50532  0.79385 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 7  1.68283 0.21957 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  1.65282  0.22716 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG 8  2.44239 0.12823 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI  2.14235  0.16576 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  0.84324 0.44219 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.18117  0.13393 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  0.40237 0.75270 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.24503  0.31743 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.39354 0.81069 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.24260  0.32658 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.34551 0.87765 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.91863  0.04649 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.02443 0.45199 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.71091  0.06218 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.81669 0.59428 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.54321  0.08780 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.06048 0.47567 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.94588  0.19781 Accept 
 
 
Slovenia 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  1.04899 0.36240 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  3.99627  0.02857 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.43184 0.25445 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  4.42395  0.01147 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  0.72253 0.58474 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.68667  0.05448 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.44662 0.81108 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  2.25943  0.08413 Reject 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.56366 0.75389 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.90514  0.13224 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.80458 0.59560 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  1.59069  0.20864 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.49564 0.83868 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.95061  0.51059 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.55058 0.09430 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.72243  0.01621 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.83716 0.16334 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  4.31159  0.01277 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.13441 0.36306 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.93067  0.01308 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.24586 0.32191 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.73322  0.04562 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.58977 0.20437 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  2.20761  0.08752 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.98702 0.12099 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  3.00779  0.03228 Reject 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.75627 0.17621 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  1.97213  0.13294 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  4.04214 0.02755 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.99519  0.15307 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  2.60377 0.07163 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.62596  0.06997 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.13271 0.10651 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.98694  0.03820 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  2.12552 0.10032 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.45571  0.06514 Reject 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  2.23365 0.08450 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.93959  0.12612 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.78062 0.16049 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  2.00137  0.11866 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  1.84703 0.15641 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  1.72754  0.18302 Accept 
 
 
Croatia 
FDI and merchandise exports (XG), hypothesis: Lag F-Statistic Probability Results 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  2.04843 0.14411 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.20237  0.81774 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.47276 0.24048 Accept  
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  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.05282  0.98370 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.42474 0.25078 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.04474  0.99600 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  1.06691 0.40119 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.40339  0.84197 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.97901 0.46168 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.54063  0.77187 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.66771 0.69669 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.39832  0.89212 Accept 
  XG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.73596 0.65976 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause XG  0.37415  0.92004 Accept 
FDI and merchandise imports (MG), hypothesis:     
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 2  4.78705 0.01453 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.59106  0.55917 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 3  3.14610 0.03850 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.38528  0.76432 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 4  2.76578 0.04616 Reject  
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.16658  0.95364 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 5  2.01258 0.11013 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.64417  0.66823 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 6  1.36083 0.27186 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.75420  0.61265 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 7  1.23138 0.33202 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.73628  0.64425 Accept 
  MG does not Granger Cause FDI 8  2.49037 0.05418 Reject 
  FDI does not Granger Cause MG  0.62700  0.74447 Accept 
FDI and GDP, hypothesis:     
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 2  1.55316 0.22760 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.09793  0.90699 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 3  1.19758 0.32875 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.11482  0.95069 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 4  1.45612 0.24527 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.13876  0.96629 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5  0.98862 0.44709 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.85682  0.52513 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 6  0.97481 0.46865 Accept  
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.92631  0.49839 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7  0.73455 0.64645 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.61378  0.73699 Accept 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 8  0.74350 0.65473 Accept 
  FDI does not Granger Cause GDP  0.47268  0.85454 Accept 
 
Table 8: Cross correlation coefficients for established Granger causality  
 
Lag Correlation coefficient 
Hungary   
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 5 0.13 
   
Bulgaria   
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.43 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 3 0.50 
   
The Czech Republic   
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 2 0.67 
   
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.57 
   
GDP Granger causes FDI 3 0.45 
   
Estonia   
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 2 0.63 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 2 0.48 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 3 0.63 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 3 0.44 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 4 0.57 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 4 0.40 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 5 0.50 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 5 0.46 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 6 0.47 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 6 0.50 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 7 0.47 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 8 0.46 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 8 0.61 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.59 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.42 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 3 0.63 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 3 0.41 
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Lag Correlation coefficient 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.56 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 4 0.40 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 5 0.51 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 5 0.43 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 6 0.45 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 7 0.47 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 8 0.47 
   
Lithuania   
GDP Granger causes FDI 2 0.51 
GDP Granger causes FDI 3 0.58 
FDI Granger causes GDP 3 0.49 
GDP Granger causes FDI 4 0.52 
GDP Granger causes FDI 5 0.48 
   
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 2 0.55 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 3 0.67 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 4 0.60 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 5 0.57 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 6 0.64 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 7 0.47 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 8 0.40 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.57 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.31 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 3 0.67 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 3 0.35 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.55 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 4 0.30 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 5 0.54 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 5 0.33 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 6 0.50 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 6 0.24 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 7 0.26 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 8 0.36 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 8 0.24 
   
Latvia   
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 2 0.64 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 3 0.67 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 4 0.64 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 7 0.26 
GDP Granger causes FDI 4 0.40 
GDP Granger causes FDI 6 0.31 
GDP Granger causes FDI 7 0.24 
GDP Granger causes FDI 8 0.33 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.43 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 4 0.68 
   
Poland   
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 2 0.70 
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 3 0.74 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.73 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 3 0.74 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.79 
   
Romania   
Merchandise exports Granger causes FDI 2 0.50 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.57 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.36 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 3 0.38 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 3 0.31 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.58 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 5 0.47 
   
The Slovak Republic   
FDI Granger causes GDP 5 -0.0796 
FDI Granger causes GDP 6 0.08 
FDI Granger causes GDP 7 0.22 
   
Slovenia   
GDP Granger causes FDI 2 0.25 
GDP Granger causes FDI 3 0.24 
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Lag Correlation coefficient 
FDI Granger causes GDP 3 0.27 
FDI Granger causes GDP 4 0.18 
FDI Granger causes GDP 5 0.22 
FDI Granger causes GDP 6 0.27 
   
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 2 0.36 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 3 0.24 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 4 0.13 
FDI Granger causes merchandise exports 5 0.29 
   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.22 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 2 0.36 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 3 0.24 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 4 0.13 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 5 0.29 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 6 0.36 
FDI Granger causes merchandise imports 7 0.10 
   
Croatia   
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 2 0.52 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 3 0.31 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 4 0.48 
Merchandise imports Granger causes FDI 8 0.03 
 
 48 
Appendix 2.  
Table 9: Basic model results  
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:48 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.801029 0.566724 3.177963 0.0021 
(?PCGDP) 6.61E-05 7.75E-05 0.852766 0.3963 
(?RINV) 0.161909 0.018329 8.833285 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.248286 0.094035 2.640358 0.0099 
(?FDI(-1)) 0.000100 8.19E-05 1.224506 0.2243 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.720596     Mean dependent var 4.761940 
Adjusted R-squared 0.706966     S.D. dependent var 4.510357 
S.E. of regression 2.441572     Sum squared resid 488.8244 
F-statistic 52.87045     Durbin-Watson stat 1.838022 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.415783     Mean dependent var 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.387285     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.629254     Sum squared resid 566.8641 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.664576    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.: Model 1 results  
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:52 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.896176 0.851752 1.052156 0.2959 
(?PCGDP) 8.50E-05 7.81E-05 1.088441 0.2796 
(?RINV) 0.161356 0.018047 8.940868 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.254493 0.091843 2.770969 0.0069 
(?FDI(-1)) 0.000112 8.09E-05 1.381857 0.1708 
REU-15 0.338356 0.226251 1.495486 0.1387 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.740226     Mean dependent va 4.863857 
Adjusted R-squared 0.724191     S.D. dependent var 4.647127 
S.E. of regression 2.440557     Sum squared resid 482.4618 
F-statistic 46.16195     Durbin-Watson stat 1.765626 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.421593     Mean dependent va 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.385889     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.632247     Sum squared resid 561.2267 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.627804    
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Table 11: Model 2 results  
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:53 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.798447 0.559154 3.216371 0.0019 
(?PCGDP) 6.71E-05 7.75E-05 0.866682 0.3886 
(?RINV) 0.159613 0.018116 8.810409 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.249759 0.093372 2.674867 0.0090 
(?FDI) 0.000106 7.71E-05 1.372006 0.1738 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.725106     Mean dependent var 4.789201 
Adjusted R-squared 0.711697     S.D. dependent var 4.529781 
S.E. of regression 2.432214     Sum squared resid 485.0845 
F-statistic 54.07433     Durbin-Watson stat 1.802138 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.413186     Mean dependent var 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.384561     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.635092     Sum squared resid 569.3842 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.647180    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.: Model 3 results 
 
 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:53 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.930587 0.814002 1.143224 0.2563 
(?PCGDP) 8.71E-05 7.79E-05 1.118404 0.2667 
(?RINV) 0.158651 0.017935 8.845814 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.256959 0.091556 2.806578 0.0063 
(?FDI) 0.000113 7.71E-05 1.461511 0.1477 
REU-15 0.323417 0.222383 1.454324 0.1497 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.741812     Mean dependent var 4.879230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.725875     S.D. dependent var 4.643840 
S.E. of regression 2.431374     Sum squared resid 478.8381 
F-statistic 46.54502     Durbin-Watson stat 1.724521 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.418405     Mean dependent var 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.382504     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.639492     Sum squared resid 564.3205 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.612056    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
Table 13: Model 4 results  
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:54 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.787608 0.535064 3.340922 0.0013 
(?PCGDP) -3.58E-06 7.12E-05 -0.050335 0.9600 
(?RINV) 0.135128 0.018762 7.202323 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.210516 0.091591 2.298428 0.0241 
(?FDI(-1)) 3.02E-05 7.62E-05 0.396218 0.6930 
(?RGDP(-1)) 0.221257 0.067679 3.269226 0.0016 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.775338     Mean dependent var 5.123191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.761470     S.D. dependent var 4.893138 
S.E. of regression 2.389785     Sum squared resid 462.5968 
F-statistic 55.90840     Durbin-Watson stat 2.178790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.460616     Mean dependent var 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427321     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.541903     Sum squared resid 523.3628 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.064781    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Model 5 results  
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:55 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.708706 0.786609 0.900963 0.3703 
(?PCGDP) 2.25E-05 7.29E-05 0.308771 0.7583 
(?RINV) 0.134677 0.018519 7.272241 0.0000 
(?REMP) 0.216679 0.090155 2.403411 0.0186 
(?FDI) 3.73E-05 0.000119 0.312531 0.7555 
(?FDI(-1)) 1.19E-05 0.000126 0.094306 0.9251 
REU-15 0.373665 0.207127 1.804036 0.0750 
(?RGDP(-1)) 0.224340 0.067156 3.340586 0.0013 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.791387     Mean dependent var 5.194385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772902     S.D. dependent var 5.002404 
S.E. of regression 2.383886     Sum squared resid 448.9502 
F-statistic 42.81299     Durbin-Watson stat 2.070011 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.473609     Mean dependent var 3.150575 
Adjusted R-squared 0.426967     S.D. dependent var 3.358948 
S.E. of regression 2.542689     Sum squared resid 510.7560 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.029312    
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Table 15: Model 6 results 
Dependent Variable: (?RGDP) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 02/01/04   Time: 20:56 
Sample: 1994 2002 
Included observations: 9 
Number of cross-sections used: 5 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 38 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
 
C 
3.312630 1.441939 2.297344 0.0288 
(?PCGDP) -0.000130 9.61E-05 -1.353335 0.1861 
(?RINV) 0.090600 0.027469 3.298239 0.0025 
(?REMP) 0.263817 0.164289 1.605814 0.1188 
(?FDI) -4.40E-05 0.000222 -0.197942 0.8444 
(?FDI(-1)) -0.000369 0.000234 -1.576303 0.1254 
REU-15 0.325410 0.263148 1.236603 0.2258 
(?RGDP(-1)) 0.101887 0.120187 0.847737 0.4033 
Weighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.803789     Mean dependent var 5.881190 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758006     S.D. dependent var 3.764259 
S.E. of regression 1.851748     Sum squared resid 102.8691 
Log likelihood -60.17333     F-statistic 17.55662 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.445368     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared 0.346919     Mean dependent var 3.886842 
Adjusted R-squared 0.194534     S.D. dependent var 2.506982 
S.E. of regression 2.249960     Sum squared resid 151.8697 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.520946    
 
 
